For ten years interest rates in the Eurozone have been declining. This has created a situation where loan or bond prepayments and subsequent refinancing transactions are potentially beneficial for debtors. The advantageousness depends on the costs induced. We analyze the favorability of debt restructuring using the method of differential investment and provide critical limits for the nominal interest rate of the new loan up to which prepayment is optimal. The calculations address both fixed and variable rate loans and consider whether the debt agreement is repaid at maturity or in annuities.
Introduction
Many debtholders, whether private households, companies or states, are caught up in high-interest long-term loans. At the same time, economic developments over the past few years have created a low-interest environment in which prepaying an existing loan and simultaneously refinancing into a new loan can be advantageous from the borrower's point of view. By redeeming an existing loan before maturity and refinancing into a loan with a lower interest rate, the amount of interest owed to the lender can be reduced significantly, potentially saving thousands of euros in the long term. Similar considerations hold for prepaying callable bonds since these are in fact simply a kind of securitized loan.
Intuitively debt restructuring seems advantageous whenever the nominal interest rate of the new loan is lower than that of the old loan. However, prepayment considerations are more complex since debt restructuring entails transaction costs. These include a possible penalty for the early redemption of the existing loan, called a prepayment penalty, as well as credit charges and a possible loan disbursement fee for taking out a new loan. Analogously, exercising the right to call a callable bond and simultaneously issuing a new bond will also lead to transaction costs. These costs need to be factored in when deliberating the advantageousness of a prepayment.
At the moment, interest rates in the Euro area are at an all-time low and have been so for quite some time. However, the market seems to anticipate that interest rates, and in consequence lending rates, will begin to rise in the (near) future, so an analysis on whether or not to restructure one's debt should be undertaken now in order to lock in the lowest possible interest rate for the new debt contract.
Although this topic is without doubt highly relevant and affects companies, states and private individuals alike, academic literature is scarce to almost non-existing. Mainstream media do seem to have caught onto the subject; however, these articles fail to provide theoretic foundations for their assertions and recommendations.
On these grounds, we examine in detail under which circumstances loan and bond prepayments make sense for debtholders, providing an intuitive solution concept for determining an upper limit on the nominal interest rate of the new loan up to which prepaying the old loan and refinancing into a new low pays off. The article is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the circumstances that have led to this favourable environment. In Section 3 we provide an exact solution as well as an easy-to-use approximation for the most common debt restructuring scenarios, taking into account the different payment modalities of the debt instruments as well as how the transaction costs incurred are to be financed. Section 4 concludes.
Background
The economic development over the past decade, fuelled by the unconventional monetary policies of the world's largest central banks, has pushed lending rates on loans and coupon rates on bonds to an all-time low. However, market indicators show that this sustained low-interest situation is not set to last. In the Unites States, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is far along its path to a more "normal" interest rate environment, having increased its key interest rate, the Federal Funds Rate, five times since the beginning of 2017. While its European counterpart, the European Central Bank (ECB), has jet to signal a specific date for its first interest rate hike, the market has already begun pricing in possible rate hikes.
Past Economic Development
The current beneficial situation for prepaying high-interest debt has arisen due to the economic developments of the past decade. For almost ten years Europe and large parts of the rest of the world have experienced a decline in interest rates, with central banks eager to keep their main 1
Prepayment Regulations
Having stated that the past economic development and the future expectations of the development of interest rates have created an environment optimal for prepaying outstanding debt, it remains to be considered whether or not a borrower is actually permitted to prepay his or her loan. Generally, prepayment is only permitted if the debt contract specifications contain provisions regarding this aspect. Otherwise prepayment is contingent on negotiations with the creditor. Many loans issued to private individuals by banks do indeed specify rules that apply to the early repayment of the loan.
In the European Union (EU) special regulations have been put in place in order to harmonize the laws concerning loans issued to consumers across the member states. In consequence, considerations on debt prepayment must always take into account whether the debtor is a consumer or not. More precisely, Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers specifies that for these loans the right to early repayment cannot be excluded and that consumers may at any time discharge their obligations fully or partially. Additionally, it specifies that the creditor is in return entitled to a fair and objectively justified compensation for possible costs directly linked to the early repayment of the loan. This compensation, however, may only be charged provided that the prepayment falls within a period for which the borrowing rate is fixed. Directive 2014/17/EU grants the EU member states the right to also implement these regulations for consumer loans relating to residential immovable property. Both directives have been translated into national law in all EU countries. In Germany the regulations can be found in the German Civil Code (BGB). In Austria Directives 2008/48/EG and 2014/17/EU are implemented in two separate acts; i.e., Verbraucherkreditgesetz (VKrG) and Hypothekar-und Immobilienkreditgesetz (HIKrG), respectively.
As mentioned above, loan prepayments may entail a so-called prepayment penalty; i.e., a compensation to the creditor for losses incurred through the early repayment of the outstanding debt. When national law or the debt contract specification does not specify any upper limits, the prepayment penalty may even exceed the present value of the remaining interest payments. For consumer loans the EU has implemented upper boundaries on the penalty. Directive 2008/48/EC specifies that the compensation may not exceed 1 % of the amount of debt repaid early if the period of time between the prepayment and the agreed termination of the loan exceeds one year. If the period does not exceed one year, the compensation may not exceed 0.5 %. In any case, the directive limits the prepayment penalty to the amount of interest the consumer would have paid during the period between the prepayment and the official maturity date. 2 For callable bonds prepayment regulations can be found in the bond indenture. The indenture may also specify a call protection period ; i.e., an initial period during which the bond cannot be repaid. Additionally, it specifies the call premium, which is the equivalent of the prepayment penalty on loans. The call premium may decrease with the remaining term between the prepayment and scheduled maturity.
Calculations
The legitimacy of our considerations lies in the fact that transaction costs are incurred when prepaying and subsequently restructuring debt. Were debt refinancing not to induce these transaction costs, it would be sensible to refinance whenever the interest rate of the new loan is lower than the interest rate of the old loan. In reality, prepayment often does entail a prepayment penalty and refinancing into a new loan usually involves additional costs. The bank may, for example, charge a loan disbursement fee, due to which the borrower receives less than the nominal value of the loan at disbursement. However, interest payments are still calculated based on the full nominal amount. Acquiring a new loan will typically also involve various other credit charges, such as lender fees, attorney fees, closing fee, etc. Since loans may either be conceptualized as fixed rate or variable rate loans, four "switching" scenarios can be distinguished (Table 1) . Our focus lies on Cases I and II; i.e., switching from a fixed rate loan to a fixed rate loan and from a variable rate loan to a fixed rate loan, respectively. Switching from a fixed rate to a variable rate loan can be seen simply as the "reverse" of Case II and replacing a variable rate loan by a new variable rate loan is merely an analysis of a change in the debtor-specific risk premium which is not the focus of our analysis. Also, Cases I and II are those for which action is implied by the current interest rate landscape and the corresponding market expectations.
Furthermore, prepayment considerations require a differentiated approach based not only on the interest rate agreement of the old and new loan, but also the repayment modalities of the debt contracts. Repayment modalities include lump sum repayment at the end of maturity, constant principal payments, and constant annual instalments (annuity repayment). The repayment modality of a loan significantly influences the amount of debt outstanding at a specific point in time, so prepayment may in some situations make sense for annuity loans but not for interest-only loans and vice-versa. For this reason, we further distinguish our calculations between loans with lump sum repayment and such that provide for annuity repayment and therefore provide different advantageousness criteria for each kind.
Our solution concept is based on the Method of Differential Investment, a method used for evaluating the advantageousness of two alternative investment projects. 3 Simply put, there are two alternative projects of which exactly one must be invested into. The initial investment costs, I, of one project exceed those of the alternative. In return, the more expensive project results in higher cash flows in future periods, C t . When deciding upon the superiority of one project over the other, first of all, the difference between the cash flows of the two projects is calculated in each period by subtracting the cash flow of the cheaper project from that of the more expensive one. An exemplary cash flow overview is illustrated in Table 2 . Then, the net present value (NPV) of the differential payments is compiled. A positive NPV implicates an investment in the more expensive project, whereas a negative NPV implies investing in the cheaper project. An NPV of zero signals indifference between the two projects.
We propose two solution approaches: (a) an exact approach (dynamic criterion) based on the NPV of the differential investment where the cash flows are discounted by the effective interest rate of the new loan, i ef f , and (b) an approximation (static criterion) based on the average profit from the differential investment where the average profit is defined as average prof it = average cash f low − imputed depreciation − imputed interest.
As mentioned above, the discount rate used in the exact solution is the effective interest rate of the new loan, i ef f . We use this rate since it most accurately reflects the current interest rate landscape and the market expectations of future interest rates. In case of lump sum repayment it is calculated from
where N om new is the nominal value, Z new t are the annual interest payments, and d is the loan disbursement discount in each case of the new loan. T is the term of the new loan in years and is equivalent to the remaining term of the old loan.
In case of annuity repayment, i ef f is derived from
and Ann new t are the annual payments, or annuities, of the new loan. Another aspect that must be considered when restructuring debt is how the transaction costs incurred are to be financed. As noted above, transaction costs include the prepayment penalty of the old loan as well as the loan disbursement fee and possible additional credit charges of the new loan. In general, two alternatives for financing transaction costs are conceivable:
1. Transaction costs can be covered via debt financing. In this case the nominal value of the new loan not only covers the outstanding debt of the old loan, N om, but also incorporates all transaction costs; i.e., the prepayment penalty, p, and the loan disbursement fee, d.
2. Alternatively, transaction costs can be covered by equity financing. Consequently, the nominal value of the new loan simply equals the outstanding nominal value of the old loan.
N om new = N om
It can be proven that borrowers are indifferent between debt and equity financing of transaction costs, so we limit the illustration of our formulas to the debt financing case. 4
Case I -Fixed Rate Loan to Fixed Rate Loan
First of all, we illustrate Case I; i.e., prepaying an existing fixed rate loan and refinancing the debt with a new fixed rate loan. In Section 3.1.1 we provide the formulas for the case where both loans have lump sum repayment (Case I.A). Section 3.1.2 covers the case of annuity loans (Case I.B).
Case I.A -Lump Sum Repayment
In Case I.A both the old and the new loan are fixed rate debt contracts with lump sum repayment. They therefore feature constant annual interest payments calculated as
for the old loan and
for the new loan. i and i new are the nominal interest rates of the old loan and the new loan, respectively. For the exact solution, in the first step, the structure of the differential payments must be determined. As can be seen from Table 3 , transaction costs are fully covered by the new loan which means that no own funds need to be employed in t = 0 when debt restructuring is carried out. 4 The proof is available on request. In the second step, the NPV of the differential payments is calculated using
with present value factor of annuity (PVF)
The NPV must be larger than zero for switching to the new loan to be preferable over keeping the old loan. Solving the equation for i new leads to the following dynamic advantageousness condition
which defines the upper limit for the nominal interest rate of the new loan. When the equation is binding, i new is the nominal interest rate of the new loan for which the borrower is indifferent between switching to a new loan and keeping the old loan. Effectively, the dynamic solution concept involves simultaneously solving a system of equations with two unknowns, namely i ef f and i new . For a quicker, albeit not as exact, solution approach we offer an approximative solution based on the average annual profit that can be made from the differential investment. The average annual profit must be larger than or equal to zero for a prepayment to pay off.
The static advantageousness condition reads as follows
where p+d T is the annual depreciation of the additional expenditure due to the new loan. A borrower generally has two options how to use our formulas. He can either insert the parameters of an existing new loan offer into the formulas in order to evaluate whether refinancing his old loan with the credit offer at hand makes sense or he can calculate an interest rate upper limit for any new loan which could serve as orientation in negotiations with potential creditors.
Take the following simple numerical example: A company currently has a ten-year loan with a nominal value of 100,000 e, a fixed nominal interest rate of 4 % (interest paid yearly in arrears), and lump sum repayment at maturity. The loan was taken out seven years ago and the company can now either keep the existing loan for the remaining three years or prepay it and take on a new three-year fixed rate loan. 5 In case of prepayment the penalty would amount to 4 % of the 5 The past term of the loan has no influence on the prepayment considerations. i.e., a prepayment penalty of 4 %, a loan disbursement fee of 2 %, and a remaining term of 3 years. The relationship between the prepayment penalty, p, and i new is inverse. The same holds true for the loan disbursement fee, d. This means that an increase in either of these two parameters causes a downward shift in the graph. The shift, however, is not parallel. Rather, there is a twist in the graph meaning that the line becomes flatter and flatter as either the prepayment penalty or the loan disbursement fee increases. The influence of the remaining term, T , on the exact solution is not inverse, on the other hand. Instead an increase in T leads to a higher limit for i new . One might argue that for all debtholders besides consumers the prepayment penalty increases with the remaining term, as it is closely related to the present value of the future interest payments. 7 Our sensitivity analyses, however, are ceterius paribus deliberations, so only one parameter is modified at a time.
Case I.B -Annuity Repayment
Unlike the interest only debt contracts mentioned in Section 3.1.1 where the nominal value of the debt is repaid as a lump sum at maturity, the amount of debt outstanding for annuity repayment loans decreases with the loan's lifetime. Case I.B focuses on the analysis of prepaying a fixed rate loan with annuity repayment and refinancing into a new such loan.
The annual payments, or annuities, of the old loan, which consist of both interest and nominal repayments, are
where the annuity factor (AF) is
The annual payments of the new loan are also constant,
with the corresponding annuity factor,
The exact solution is once again derived from the NPV of the cash flows of the differential investment which are depicted in Table 4 .
7 As mentioned in Section 2.4, the prepayment penalty on consumer loans is capped at 1 % respectively 0.5 %.
Since the NPV must be larger than or equal to zero for the loan prepayment and subsequent refinancing to pay off, the dynamic advantageousness condition is
For the approximation the average annual profit of the differential payments,
is calculated, resulting in the same advantageousness conditions as for the exact solution (see Equations (16) and (17)).
Reconsider the company from the numeric example in Section 3.1.1. In Case I.B the company has an existing loan with the same conditions as specified above. The only difference is that the loan now has annuity instead of lump sum repayment. This means that after the seven years that have passed, the outstanding amount of debt of the old loan has been reduced to 20,419.61 e. Provided that all expenses are to be covered by debt financing the nominal value of the new loan must be 21,669.79 e. Equation (16) states that the annuity of the new loan must not exceed the annuity of the old loan. So the upper limit on the new annuity is 7,358.18 e which implies an upper limit on the nominal interest rate of the new loan of 0.931 %. Figure 8 shows the sensitivity analyses for Case I.B. The interpretation is the same as for Case I.A; i.e., the higher the prepayment penalty or the loan disbursement fee, the lower the upper limit on i new . In other words, the higher any one of these two parameters, the more stringent is the upper limit on the nominal interest rate of the new loan. The opposite counts for the remaining term of the old loan, where a longer term implies more leeway for i new .
Case II -Variable Rate Loan to Fixed Rate Loan
This section shows the calculations for Case II; i.e., replacing an existing variable rate loan with a fixed rate loan. Once again we first cover refinancing an existing loan with lump sum repayment into a new loan with lump sum repayment (Case II.A) and subsequently focus on the case of annuity repayment loans (Case II.B).
Case II.A -Lump Sum Repayment
In Case II.A both loans feature lump sum repayment. The annual interest payments of the old loan are
where Ref t−1 is the reference interest rate in the t th -period [t − 1, t] and RP is the risk premium (or quoted margin). The estimates for the future reference interest rates, Ref t , are calculated using
where IRS t is the interest rate swap with maturity t. The annual interest payments of the new loan are calculated in the same manner as in Case I.A using Equation (5). As in Case I, the exact solution is derived by setting up a table of payments (Table 5 ) and subsequently calculating the NPV of the differential investment using i ef f as the calculation interest rate. The resulting dynamic advantageousness condition is As can be seen from Table 5 , the annual interest payments of the old loan can now differ from one period to another since they are dependent on the stochastic reference rate. For this reason, the interest differential can no longer be calculated using the PVF. Instead, the constant nominal interest rate i from Equation (8) is replaced by the actuarial average of the future variable interest rates, where the term
is the average future reference rate.
The approximation for Case II.A is again calculated using the average annual profit from the differential investment,
resulting in the static advantageousness condition
Here, i ∅ is the arithmetic average of the expected future reference rates adjusted by the risk premium.
Once again a numeric example should serve as illustration. As in Case I.A, a company has a ten-year loan with nominal value of 100,000 e, lump sum repayment, yearly interest payments in arrears, and a remaining term of three years. However, interest payments are now variable, with the 6M-Euribor at the beginning of each period used as the reference rate adjusted. The quoted margin is 3.5 %. The company can once again decide between keeping the existing loan for the remaining three years or prepaying it and taking out a new three-year fixed rate loan. The prepayment penalty is unchanged at 4 % of the nominal value of the old loan while the transaction costs associated with the new loan amount to 2 % of its nominal value. In this case, since the old loan is a variable rate loan, the expectations of the future reference rates play a key role. Using the interest rate swaps on May 3, 2018, the following reference rates for the upcoming three periods are derived:
Since all transaction costs are to be covered by debt financing, the nominal value of the new loan must again be 106,122 e. The exact solution then delivers 1.449 % as the upper limit for the nominal interest rate of the new loan while the approximation leads to 1.413 %. This is significantly Case II.B focuses on with switching from a variable rate to a fixed rate loan when both loans are annuity loans. The annuity of the old loan is
with annuity factor
The annual payments are again stochastic because the interest component depends on the reference rate at the beginning of each period.
The outstanding nominal value is
and the annual payments of the new fixed rate loan are constant and are calculated using Equation (12). Table 6 shows the cash flows of the two alternatives and the resulting differential investment. Debt prepayment and restructuring is once again advantageous when the NPV of the differential payments is larger than or equal to zero.
This leads to the exact advantageousness condition
or
The approximation is derived from the average annual profit from the differential investment,
where
Ann t .
nominal interest rate of the new loan while increasing the remaining term will raise the maximum i new , all other parameters held constant. It must be noted that in Case II.B the approximation may lead to a higher upper limit on i new than the exact solution. This means that a debtor may carry out a refinancing transaction based on the static criterion that in fact is not optimal judging by the dynamic advantageousness criterion. However, it lies in the nature of an approximation that it can lead to false positive decisions.
Conclusion and Final Remarks
Loan prepayment and subsequent debt refinancing is currently advantageous under specific circumstances due to the favourable interest rate landscape as well as market expectations of rising interest rates. However, the advantageousness of such an action depends on different factors. First and foremost, for all debt agreements besides loans issued to consumers, prepayment is contingent on the consent of the creditor. If the debt contract specifications of the existing loan do not specify any prepayment modalities, it lies within the creditor's discretion whether and under which conditions a prepayment is possible. Generally, debt restructuring causes transaction costs. In most cases the creditor will charge a prepayment penalty, designed to compensate the losses incurred through the early repayment of the outstanding debt. This penalty can amount to the present value of the remaining interest payments or may even be higher if nothing is defined in the debt contract specifications. In the EU, regulations exist that cap the prepayment penalty. For consumer loans, depending on whether the remaining term of the old loan exceeds one year or not, the penalty is limited 1 % and 0.5 % of the amount of debt prepaid, respectively. Finally, if prepayment is carried out in combination with refinancing, also the terms of the new loan must be taken into account when evaluating the advantageousness. We propose a solution approach based on the method of differential investment and provide both an exact solution for calculating the upper bound of the nominal interest rate of the new loan as well as an approximation that, although not as precise, provides reasonable indications of whether to restructure or not. The exact solution is derived by applying a net present value concept to the differential investment while the approximation focuses on the average profit of the differential payments.
Finally, we have to remark that profitable debt restructuring with loan prepayment might be falsely omitted by the decision-makers because it results in an increase of the current debt level. The agent may want to avoid restructuring existing debt even if the present value of future interest savings is larger than the debt level increase. This is especially plausible if his or her reputation or performance is negatively connected to this key figure, or if the agent is near the end of his or her term of office and does not benefit from interest savings in the future. This leads to a principal-agent-problem of omitted debt restructuring.
